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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE JACKSON and MILDR.ED
JACKSON, his \vife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
H. T. COPE and T. TRUMAN COPE,
Co-partners, doing business under
the firm name and style of Cope
Brothers Lumber Co.,
Defendants a.nd Appellants.

c·ase No.

8012

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We vigorously disagree with counsel that "plaiintiffs
authorized the loaning institution to discharge funds
from their account directly to Holmes upon presentation by him of lien waivers from the various laborers and
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material men with whom he was doing business." The
fact is that the Union Trust Co. was authorized to
advance the funds to Holmes "to pay bills for labor and
for materials in the construction of" the Jackson house.
(See Defendants Exhibit 1). Counsel in said statement
of fact and his later argument is representing to the
court that Holmes had the right to draw from the Jackson account money to pay any of his laborers or material
men with whom Holmes was doing business no matter
which of the many houses Holmes might have worked on
or furnished materials for. The agreement speaks for
itself. The labor or materials must have been furnished
for the Jackson home (Exhibit 1).
We wish also to add to the facts that there 1s a
custom in this community whereby holders of money,
such as was the Union Trust Co., in this case, would pay
the contractors upon receipt of lien waivers for 1naterials
and labor furnished for the particular job for which the
1noney was deposited. The appellants were fa1niliar with
that custom (R. 14, 31 and 72). With this kno\vledge
the appel'lants executed and delivered to Hohnes the
lien waiver in blank, except as to the a1nount and the
date (R. 33). The appellants left it to Holrnes judgtnent
to make out and use the lien waiver properly ( R. 35).
The respondents had left about $9,300.00 with the Union
Trust Co., to be disbursed according to Exhibit 1 (R. 36).
Holmes wrongfully inserted the address of the respondents' home that he was building at 1777 11~a~t ~1st ~outh
Street and used it to get the $700.00 fron1 the rr~pond-
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ents' account at Union Trust Co. when no materials or
services \\Tere rendered by appellants on that home (R.
3:2 and 5~). Appellant, H. T. Cope, told respondent,
\Y. ayne Jackson, \Yhen Jackson went to him to inquire
specifically if appellants had furnished any materials
on his house, that they did not furnish any. Ten days
or t\vo \Yeeks later after appellants had been served
\\?ith process in this action, H. T. Cope phoned Wayne
Jackson at his home at 6:30 in the morning and added
they had delivered some lumber to "Holmes' warehouse
and that it could have gone anywhere from there" (R.
39).
Respondents claim by the action ~f appellants in
executing the lien waiver in blank, and it being completed and used ·by Holmes, in a wrongful manner and
to the loss of respondents in the sum of $700.00 that in
equity and good conscience appellants should be required
to reimburse respondents. The district court thought so
and gave judgment to respondents.

STATE~fENT

OF· POINTS

POINT I.
CAN A MATERIAL MAN ISSUE TO A CONTRACTOR
LIEN WAIVERS SIGNED BY THE MATERIAL MAN IN
BLANK LEAVING IT TO THE CONTRACTOR TO FILL IN
THE BLANK SPACES AS HE WISHES AND NOT BE
RESPONSIBLE TO AN INJURED PARTY WHER~ THE
LIEN WAIVERS WERE WRONGFULLY COMPLETED AND
USED TO OBTAIN MONEY WHICH NEITHER THE CONTRACTOR NOR THE MATERIAL MAN WAS ENTITLED TO?
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ANSWER TO APPE·LLANTS' POINTS I AND II.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN FINDINGS
NO. 6 AND 7 THAT APPELLANTS DID NOT FURNISH ANY
MATERIAL OR SERVICE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
RESPONDENTS' HOME FOR THE $700.00 RECEIVED BY
APPELLANTS?

ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT III.
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT IV.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE
PRE-TRIAL ORDER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
CAN A MATERIAL MAN ISSUE TO A CONTRACTOR
LIEN WAIVERS SIGNED BY THE MATERIAL MAN IN
BLANK LEAVING IT TO THE CONTRACTOR TO FILL IN
THE BLANK SPACES AS HE WISHES AND NOT BE
RESPONSIBLE TO AN INJURED PARTY WHERE THE
LIEN WAIVERS WERE WRONGFULLY COMPLETED AND
USED TO OBTAIN MONEY \VHICH NEITHER THE CONTRACTOR NOR THE MATERIAL MAN WAS ENTITLED TO?

On or about October 27, 1950, the Cope Brothers
Lumber Co., appeHants, received a $700.00 cheek and n
blank lien waiver from J. H. IIolmes, (~ontractor. In
return for that check the lien waiver was signed by
appellants and the a1nount of $700.00 \VUR plneed thPn)on
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and the date, and then that lien \vaiver was sent back
to :J[r. l-Ioln1es, the appellants having full knowledge
of the fact that ~Ir. Holmes \Vas going to be able to
collect $700.00 fron1 son1e person's account on the
strength of that lien waiver. The appellants had no idea
at all whose account \vas going to be diminished by their
having ·signed that lien \vaiver, for the person's name
for whom materials should have been furnished was not
filled in. It \Vas left in blank by appellants. It seems,
also, that the contractor, J. H. Holmes, was indebted at
this time to appellants in the amount of about $3,900.00
(R. 3-±). In other \vords, the $700.00 received on said
October :27, 1950 \Vent to appellants to be applied on this
past indebtedness for materials already furnished to J.
H. Holmes. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the
\vhole record that any material was furnished by the
Cope Brothers Lumber Co. that went into or that was to
be used in the respond en t''S home. In fact, the evidence
strongly points the other way. Where is there any showing by appellants that they delivered or furnished any
1na terial that \vas to be used in the Wayne Jackson
house~

nlr. Cope himself told l\1r. Jackson (R. 38-39) that
Cope Bros. Lumber Co. had not furnished any material
for his home, and there is no doubt but what that was
actually the case. When the $700.00 was received by
appellants on the strength of the blank lien waiver signed
by them, the Wayne Jackson home was hardly started,
being only in the excavation stage (R. 43). Therefore,
any materials furnished by appellants before this time
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was no doubt used or to be used on the other jobs of
Holmes. In other words, there is no evidence of any
materials furnished by Cope Bros. Lumber Co. for use
in the Wayne Jackson Home.
The appellants have cited the case of Bounds vs.
Nuttle, 30 Atlantic 2nd 263, in their brief at page 18.
We feel that this case does not apply to the instant case.
The mechanics lein law as a protection to material1nen
seems to be the thing in issue there, and deals with an
ovvner vvho negligently paid money out to a contractor
and did not see to it that it was applied to the pay1nent
of the materials going into the building after the materinl
man had delivered the 1naterials for the particular job.
In the case at hand, the owner received no materials for
his job from the material man. The material 1nan n1ust
at least see to it that the materials for which he i~ paid
are delivered.
The respondents in the trial court proved that the
Cope Brothers Lumber Co. had received some $700.00
for materials from the account of Wayne Jackson but
that none of their materials were furnished for the construction of his home. The respondent proved that the
1naterials which went into their ho1ne came from entirely
different sources, as was testified to by nf r. Felt of the
~fill Creek Lumber Co. 1\fr. Felt had 1nade visits, kept
careful records of deliveries to the '\rayne J arkson job,
and knew that their materiall-' were being furnished for
this particular job ( R. 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55).
The trial rourt, in vie\v of this evidence, \Vas ePrtninly ju~tified in holding a~ it did that the ( 0pP Rrothrr~
1
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Lumber Co. did not furnish any n1aterial nor render
any service for the construction of respondents' home
at 1777 East 21st South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
(R. 7:2). The appellants did not in any way rebut this
evidence. In fact, the Cope Brothers Lumber Co. had
no records, data or recollection at all either for materials
furnished that were used in respondents' home or for
materials that "'"ere furnished for the use in said home.
Appellants certainly had some burden there, and they
failed completely.
The appellants in their Brief, Point III, place particular stress on the fact that the judgment is contrary
to the la,v. This certainly is not the case. The evidence
clearly shows that there were no materials of Cop,e
Brothers I_.jumber Co. actually used in the structure of
respondents, and that there was no delivery of their
materials to responden,ts' premises for use in their home,
whether actually used there or not. Appellants have
referred to a number of citations in their brief dealing
with the point that a 1naterial man is entitled to a lien
whether his materials were actually incorporated into
the structure or not. We should like to emphasize here,
however, that even these references indicate that the
materials furnished must have been for a particula,r
building or improvement. Where is there any evidence
that appellants furnished any materials for the particular Wayne Jackson job~ There is none. Is a material
1nan entitled to a lien on all the properties on which the
contractor purchaser is doing work when material is
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obtained by that contractor and the material man does
not know for what job or for what purpose the n1aterial
was obtained~ Certainly that could not be the law. The
inequities that ·would result from such a situation -are
obvious. Now coming back again to the law, argued in
appellants' brief, we believe that the question is fully
answered and discussed in 36 American Juris prudence,
Sec. 72, page 5-9:
"There is conflict of authority on the question
"\vhether a material man is entitled to a lien for
materials not actually incorporated in to the structure. Som-e courts have taken the view that under
mechanics' lien la\vs a material man is not entitled
to a lien for materials unless they were actually
used or incorporated into, and became part of the
structure against which the lien is sought to be
enf oreed."
Of course this is the law that respondents contend is the
proper law to be applied to this case, and there are
numerous cases to support it. There are other courts,
however, that have held the opposite vie,v, but there are
qualifications to be noted under this view. Again quoting
from 36 American Jurisprudence, Section 74, page Gl :
Even in those jurisdictions in which a lien
n1ay be acquired for rnaterial furnished although
it has not actually been incorporated in the building, structure, or irnprovernen t, it is generally
held that the lien cannot attach in the absence of
a delivery of the rnaterial upon the prPtni~P~, or
other act equivalent then•to, as notice to or an
irnplierl assent hy the O\\'"ner."
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In the instant case there 'Yas no such delivery of
materials upon respondents' premises from the Cope
Brothers Lumber Co. The only thing that was done by
appellants eYidently 'vas to credit J. H. ·Holmes account
$700.00 for past indebtedness.
Therefore it is our contention that there was no
right of lien at any time in the Cope Brothers Lumber
Co. in respect to the Wayne Jackson property. Consequently 'vhen appellants signed said blank lien waiver,
they 'vere giving no consideration. They were not giving
up a remedy (a lien right), for they had none. Yet appellants were fully aware that said lien waiver, in essence,
represented money-some $700.00. The Union Trust
Company had instructions to only withdraw from the
vVayne Jackson account when lien waivers were properly
filled out. Yes, we believe there was a duty on the part
of the Cope Brothers Lumber Company to properly fill
out said lien waiver and to know that they had actually
furnished materials for the particular job from whenc·e
the money was coming; this was not done in the instant
case, and consequently this negligence on the part of
appellants resulted in respondents' loss. The burden of
this loss should properly be shifted then to the shoulders
of the party whose negligence made the loss possible.
We refer to the case of Imperial Valley Box Co. v.
Reese (233 P 2nd 629), in which the doctrine is cited
that "where one of two innocent persons must suffer by
the act of a third, the one by whose negligence it happened must be the sufferer." Again from 2 American
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Jurisprudence, Section 70, page 701, "one delivering an
instrument in blank is estopped to deny liability." Aside
from the question of negligence which we feel the trial
court could also have allowed a recovery on, the respondents believe that said court was fully justified in holding
as it did on the theory of "Money Had and Received.··
We have already noted that this action lies when defendant has obtained money from plaintiff which in equity
and good conscience should be returned to plaintiffHow the Cope Brothers Lumber Co. could obtain $700.00
from the Jacksons in this instance by means of signing
a blank lien waiver, and having failed to render to then1
$700.00 worth of service or 1naterials, and still clain1 that
in equity and good conscience they should not have to
return said money is beyond our understanding.
We feel it is a si1nple matter in that the appellants
have received something for which they have given
nothing in return when they were under obligation to do
so, and therefore they ought, in good conscience, to
return that which they have received.
Respondents wish to ans\ver the various Points
argued in appellants' brief as follo\vs:

ANSWERING POINTS I AND IT.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN FINDINGS
NO.6 AND 7 THAT APPELLANTS DID NOT FURNISH ANY
l\IATERIAL OR SERVICE FOR TilE CONSTRUCTION OF
RESPONDENTS' HOME FOR TI-IE $700.00 RECEIVED BY
APPELLANTS?
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It is admitted in the pre-trial order that appellants
received the $700.00 on the lien waiver ( R. 31).
Ample evidence is in the record to sustain the finding
that no material or services were furnished by app·ellants
for respondents' home. \\; ayne Jackson testified he knows
Cope Brothers Lumber Co. did not furnish any lumber in
his house (R. 37). Jacks~n was told by H. T. Cope on
tw·o occasions they had no lumber in the house (R. 38
and 39). The $700.00 which appellants, through Holmes,
got out of Union Trust Co. from respondents' account
by reason of the fraudulent lien waiver was money which
should have been used for valid claims, hence the Jackson account at the Union Trust Co. was depleted $700.00
In equity and good conscience the appeHants should
return that money. Besides the positive evidence in the
statement by Mr. Cope to Mr. Jackson that they had no
lumber in the house, we have the further evidence by
1\[r. Felt of the ~lillcreek Lumber Co. that it should
cost between $2500.00 to $3,000.00 in lumber for a completed house of the size of the Jacksons (R.. 54). We
have his testimony also that at the time Holmes left the
Jackson job the Millcreek Lumber Co. had furnished
$2,329.96 of the lumber for it (R. 55). Then we have
Jackson's testimony he spent $1100.00 more on lumber to
complete this jo'b through a contractor named Harry
Cook, who bought the lumber from the Sugar House
Lumber Co. (R. 60 and 61). It appears then that all of
the lumber that went into the house cost $3,429.96 and
that from all this evidence was not the court fully justi-
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fied in finding that the appellants did not furnish any
of the materials for the construction of respondents'
home~ Through the whole testimony there is not a
scintilla of evidence that any of appellants' lumber went
into the Jackson home.
On page 12 of appellants' brief counsel states that
Felt of the Millcreek Lumber Co. said it would take
$2500.00 to $3000.00 in materials to co1nplete while Cope
said it would be 40% of the total construction. If the
court will refer to the record, page 54, it will see that
1fr. Felt was speaking of only the lu1nber while 1\ir.
Cope was speaking of all material furnished by a lun1ber
company, except plumbing, brick and wiring. Hard\vare
and many other items besides lun1ber are furnished by
lumber companies. So the comparison vvas not a fair
one. If there was a conflict here the court had a right
to believe Mr. F'elt, a distinterested party, and to di~
regard the testimony of Mr. Cope, an interested party.

ANSWERING POINT III.
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND THE JUDGI\IENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

We feel that counsel is in error in his points I and II.
It therefore follo\vs, if that be the case, the court did
not err in entering its eonelusion of la\v and judgJttPnt.
We think that our statute on liens has no bearing on the
issue involved in this case. Appellants pre~~nted no
evidence that any building Inaterials \VPl'P ~old hy thPnl
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to Holmes for use in respondents' dwelling. If any
1naterials had been sold for use in respondents' dwelling
appellants could have easily proved it by their books but
no such evidence was offered. Holmes took respondents
money to pay an old account with appeHants who no
doubt were pressing him. The only way appellants were
able to get that $700.00 was the signing of a blank lien
\vaiver. Had appellants filled out the lien waiver, putting
the address of some house they had actually sold material for they would never have got the $700.00 because
the circumstances were such that we could fairly assume
Holmes had drawn down as much as he could on those
accounts and in order to try to keep his head above
water, he had to dip into the newer accounts. The blank
lien waiver of appellants made it convenient for Holmes
to do that. When they gave Holmes the lien waiver
signed in blank, they by such action gave him authority
to fill in the blank spaces for them. Hence, in that
respect, he \Vas their agent.
We do not agree with counsel that Holmes was
respondents' agent. He was an independent contractor.
(Rigney v. DeLaSalle Institution, 52 P 2nd 579 Calif.).
Holmes had a written contract to fulfill with respondents.
He was not authorized in any respect to act for them.
On the other hand, he was an agent of appellants in
respect to the lien waiver. "Agency is created when one
is authorized by another to act in some respect for him."
\;ol 2, Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., p. 717. He was
authorized by them to fill out the blanks in the lien
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waiver. As their agent, he wrongfully made it out and
was able to get money of innocent parties.
By Holmes and appellants executing the lien waiver
In question, the appellants did not give up any right
as counsel con tends. They had no lien right as against
respondents' property, so they could not give up a right.
As to negligence, of course, we claim appellants
were negligent when they placed in the hands of Hohnes
a lien waiver signed in blank by which he was enabled to
defraud innocent parties. "Negligence is any conduct ...
which falls below the standard established by law· for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm." Vol. 28, Words and Phrases, Perm Ed, p. 336.
The fact that negligence is involved does not mean that
recovery cannot be had on grounds of 1noney had and
received or even on both grounds.
"Action for money had and received is equitable in nature, and lies to recover 1noney in hands
of defendant which in equity and good conscience
belongs to plaintiff." 'l ol. 27, Words and PhraSP:-\~
Perm. Ed., page 478.

ANSWERIN·G POINT J\T.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN Al\IENDING THE
PRE-TRIAL ORDER.

This same question was discussed and decided hy
this court in Reich et ux, v. ChristoJntlos, et al., on April
16, 19'53, at 256 P. 2d page 238 ______ Utah ------· Thr court
held that the atnendinent \Va~ not an error nnd on pn.~.!Y
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2-!1 said: ''The amendment made was equivalent to an
a1nendmen t to conform to the evidence. The trial court
did that which \Yas necessary and proper to effectuate
justice." The same question being involved in this case,
\Ye see no reason to discuss it further.

CON·CLUSION

The respondents respectfully submit that the view
held by the trial court is the proper one and that the
appeal should be dismissed and the judgment of the
District Court should be affirmed with cost to respondents.
Respectfully submitted,
YOUNG & YOUNG,
1003-08 Boston Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
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